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Abstract: Agent-based computational economics (ACE) is roughly defined as the
computational study of economies modelled as evolving decentralized systems of au
tonomous interacting agents. A key focus of ACE research is understanding how global
regularities' arise from th'e-bottorn^up, through the repeated local interactions-of au
tonomous agents channeled through socipreconomic institutions, rather than from top
down coordination mechanisms such as imposed market clearing constraints or an as
sumption of single representative agents. This paper discusses how ACE materials have
been.introduced into graduate-level courses in macroeconomic theory over the past sev
eral years, using an ACE labor market framework for concrete illustration.
1 Introduction
The newly developing field of agent-based computational economics (ACE) is roughly defined
by its practioners as the. computational study of economies modelled as evolving decentralized
systems of autonomous interacting agents. A principal concern of ACE researchers is to understand
the apparently spontaneous formation of global regularities in'economic processes, such as the
unplanned coordination of trading activities in decentralized market economies that economists
associate withAdamSmith'sinvisible hand.'Thechallenge is to explain how theseglobal regularities
arise through repeated local-interactions of autonomous agents, channeled through socio-economic
institutions rather than throughfictitious, coordination mechanisms suchas imposed market clearing
constraints or an assumption of single representative agents. ...
The study of evolutionary economics is by no means new, of course. Even before Darwin,
attempts were made to apply evolutionary ideas to socio-economic behavior (Richards [47]). Al
though this early work is now largely ignored by economists, economic textbooks still typically
include at least some mention of the ideas of Joseph Schumpeter [53] regarding the evolution of
economic institutions.
Moreover, Schumpeter's work, together with the seminal work by Armen Alchian [2] on un
certainty and evolution in economic systems, appears to have strongly influenced the subsequent
well-known work by Nelson and Winter [45] and various of their collaborators on evolutionary
theories of economic change. In addition, one has the work of W. Brian Arthur on economies
incorporating positive feedbacks, the work by Richard Day on dynamic economies characterized
by complex phase transitions, the work by John Foster on an evolutionary approach to macroe
conomics, Ron Reiner's work on the origins of predictable behavior, Jack Hirshleifer's work on
evolutionary models in economics and law, and Ulrich Witt's work on economic natural selection.
These and numerous other interesting studies on evolutionary economics are reviewed by Witt [63]
and Nelson [44]. More recentlj', as detailed in Friedman [19], Fudenberg and Levine [20], Hofbauer
and Sigmund [25], and Samuelson [51], a number of researchers have been focusing on the potential
economic applicability of evolutionary game theory with replicator dynamics in which game strate
gies distributed over a fixed number of strategy types reproduce over time in direct proportion to
their relative fitness.
Exploiting the recent advent of more powerful computational tools, such as object-oriented pro
gramming, ACE researchers have been able to extend this earlier work on evolutionary economics
in four key ways. First, agents in ACE frameworks are typically modelled as heterogeneous entities
that determine their interactions with other agents and with their environment on the basis of
internalized data and behavioral rules. These agents thus tend to have a great deal more inter
nal cognitive structure and autonomy than conventionally modelled economic agents. Second, a
broader range of agent interactions is typically permitted in ACE frameworks, with predatory and
cooperative associations taking centerstage along with price and quantity relationships. Third, the
evolutionary process is generally represented as natural selection pressures acting directly on agent
characteristics rather than as population-level laws of motion. These natural selection pressures
result in the continual creation of new modes of agent behavior and an ever-changing network of
agent interactions. Fourth, ACE frameworks are computer implemented as virtual economic worlds
that grow themselves along a real time-bne, much like a culture dish develops in a laborator>'. In
principle, once initi^ conditions are set, all subsequent events in these virtual economic worlds
are initiated and driven by agent-agent and agent-environment interactions; no further outside
interventions by the modeler (e.g.. off-line fixed point calculations) are permitted.
In brief, then, ACE is a blend of concepts and tools from evolutionary economics, cognitive
science, and computer science.^ It represents a methodological approach that may ultimately
permit two important developments: (a) the rigorous testing, refinement, and extension of theories
developed in the earlier literature on evolutionary economics that were found to be analytically
intractable; and (b) the rigorous formulation and testing of conceptually integrated socio-economic
theories compatible with theory and data from many different relevant fields currently separated by
artificial disciplinary boundaries. Examples of studies focusing on key ACE-related issues include:
Anderson et al. [3]; Arifovic [4]; Arthur [5]; Arthur et al. [6]; Axelrod [8]; Bell [9]; Birchenhall [10];
BuUard and Duffy [11]; De Vany [13]; Duong [16]; Durlauf [17]; Epstein and Axtell [18]; Gode and
Sunder [22]; Guriev and Shakhova [24]; Holland [26]; Holland and Miller [27]; Kirman [29, 30, 31);
KoUman et al. [32]; Lane [33]; Mailath et aJ. [37]; Marimon et al. [38]; Marks [39]; McFadzean and
Tesfatsion [41]; Miller [42]; Routledge [49]; Rust et al. [50]; Sargent [52]; Shubik [54]; Tesfatsion [57,
59, 60, 61]; Vriend [62]; and Young [64, 65].
How might ACE be taught to graduate students in a typical department of economics today?
In keeping with the subject matter of ACE, as well as the newness of the methodological approach
A^s explained more carefully in Trafatsion [58], ACE can be viewed as a specialization to ecojiomics of the basic
artificial life (alife) paradigm. For interesting introductions to alife, see Levy [35], Lindgren [36], and Sigmand [55].
for economic study, I do not believe that any definitive top-down answer to this question can or
should be given; let 550 flowers bloom.^ Rather, I will simply suggest one way this teaching can be
initiated by outlining how I have introduced ACE materials in macroeconomics theory courses for
Ph.D. and Masters level students at Iowa State University over the past several years.^
Briefly, in keeping with the importance of coordination issues for macroeconomics, I devote
a third of the course to this topic. I start by presenting to students a bare-bones version of
the basic economic paradigm of coordination success, Walrasian general equilibrium. As detailed
in Katzner [28], this paradigm represents a precisely formulated set of conditions under which
feasible allocations of goods and services can be supported by price systems in decentralized market
economies characterized by price-taking consumers and firms and private ownership of capital and
labor. Its defining structural characteristic is that direct agent-agent interactions do not take place.
Rather, all agent-agent interactions are mediated by an implicit clearing house colorfully referred
to as the Walrasian Auctioneer.^
More precisely, strategic interaction is said to occur between two agents if the choice of a decision
for at least one of the agents depends upon what he perceives or expects the decision of the other
agent to be. The Walrasian general equilibrium model reflects the view that, in decentralized
market economies, price systems reduce or even eliminate the need for economic agents to interact
strategically. The key observation here is that values for prices and dividend payments constitute
the only information conveyed to consumers and firms in the Walrasian general equilibrium model.
Since prices and dividend payments are treated as parameters by these agents in their decision
problems, these decision problems reduce to "control" problems. That is, the decision problem for
each agent only includes decision variables fully under the agent's own control; the decision variables
for other agents do not appear, implying there is no strategic interaction. In systems science
^Splitting the difference between Mao Tse-Tung's 100 flowers and George H. W. Bush's 1000 points of light.
^See www.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ502/tesfatsion/ for a complete syllabus for one such course.
^This terminology appears to have been introduced by Leijonhufvud [34l in his interesting critique of the Walrasi-
fication of Keynes' general theory that occurred when attempts were made to represent this theory within an IS-LM
framework.
parlance, the global allocation problem has been decomposed^into a collection of individual agent"
allocation problems by the introductionoflinking variables (prices and dividends). The equilibrium
values for the linking variables are determined by calculations performed by the fictitious Walrasian
Auctioneer; they do not arise from any actions of the consumers or firms within the model.
To test the robustness of the Walrasian general equilibrium model to changes iii its structure,
I then ask students to introduce one "simple" change into this paradigm — namely, let firms set
their ownprices — at which point the paradigm is seen to collapse like a house of cards. This leads
naturally into a discussion of the need to consider a more comprehensive and realistic modelling
of agent interactions in relation to macro regularities, a key focus of ACE research. I then present
. \ ."I .
various illustrations of non-Walrasian modelling, including ongoingACE research that appears to be
! I ' I ' , 'J.' • '> •
particularly relevant for studying the self-organizing capabilities of decentralized market economies.
Students interested in further ACE study are directed to the extensive resources I maintain on an
ACE Web site at www.ecpn.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/ace.htm, including ACE surveys, an annotated
1 . . , 1 ' . . I , < ' • ' ' -li. ! • >
syllabus of ACE-related readings, pointers to ACE software, and pointers to other ACE-related
•1 • • . ' . -I' ' • . •
Web sites.
In the following sections, for concreteness, I focus on one particular illustration of the ACE
approach: an ACE framework for studying the formation and evolution of contractual networks in
liu ' , . ,1 • , • i' • . . . , ••• • '
labor markets with adaptive search and worksite behavior.® While not a full-blown multiple-market
" . " i; / t I • • 1 ,
treatment of a decentralized market economy, the labor market framework demonstrates how an
ACE approach facilitates the modelling of markets from an agent-based perspective and permits
the rigorous experimental study of non-steady-state dynamics. The framework builds on a series
I' ; I
of earlier studies [7, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61].
®The ACElabor market framework is implemented by means of the C+-f- trade network game (TNG) framework
(version 105b) develpped by McFadzean and Tesfatsion [41], which, in turn is supported by SimBioSys, a general
C+-f- class library for evolutionary simulations developed by McFadzean [40]. The source code for both SimBioSys
and the TNG framework are available for downloading as freeware at the current author's Web site.
1 . . i : 7 • • ^ .
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2 An ACE Labor Market Framework
An interesting theoretical literature stressing job search and matching in labor markets has
flourished since the influential work by Diamond [14, 15] on search equilibrium. See, for example,
Aghion and Howitt [1, Chapter 4]. To achieve analytical tractability, however, researchers in this
literature commonly postulate an aggregate matching function that proxies the complicated process
of employer recruitment, worker search, and mutual evaluation. That is, the intense individualistic
rivalry among workers and employers that characterizes many real-world labor markets is not
modelled. Moreover, again for tractability, the competition of ideas within agents is generally
ignored in this literature; attention is largely focused on steady-state equilibrium behavior.
In Tesfatsion [61] it is conjectured that some of the tractability problems encountered in analyti
cal labor market studies might be alleviated by taking an ACE approach. To explore this possibility,
a simple labor market framework is developed that builds on the ACE trade network game (TNG)
developed in Tesfatsion [57, 58] for studying the formation and evolution of trade networks under
alternatively specified market structures. As will be clarified below, this labor market framework
endogenizes many aspects of labor markets at the level of individual agents that theoretical labor
market studies generally specify in a more restricted static way either as exogenously given param
eters or through aggregate steady-state relationships: for example, worker preference orders over
potential employers; employer preference orders over potential workers; job search and search costs;
contractual matching; worker and employer worksite behaviors; worker compensations; employer
earnings; quit rates; firing rates; turnover costs; and unemployment rates.
The ACE labor market framework consists of three disjoint (and possibly null) subpopulations
of agents that separately evolve over time: pure workers who make work offers; pure employers
who receive work offers: and worker-employers capable of both making and receiving work offers.
The pure workers and worker-employers are collectively referred to as workers, and the worker-
employers and pure employers are collectively referred to as employers. Each worker can have
int main () {
InitO;
For (G = l,...,GMax) {
InitGen();
For (I = l,...,IMax) {
Matchltaders0;'
I
Trade();
UpdateExpO;
}
AssessFitnessO;
Output();
EvolveGen();
}.
Return 0;
// Construct initial subpopidations of pure workers,
// worker-employers, and pure employers with
III random worksite strategies
II Enter the generation cycle loop.
11 Generation Cycle:
II Configure all agents with user-supplied
//> parameter values (initial expected utility
II. levels, work offer/acceptance quotas,...)-
11 Enter the trade cycle loop.
11 .Trade Cycle: >>'
.// Determine worksite partners,
II' -pven expected utilities,
II ] and record refusal and
II wallflower payoflfs.
II .. Eng^e in.worksite interactions
II and record worksite payofTs.
// Update expected utilities
// xisingnewly recorded payoffs.
II Environmental Step:
//" Assos'agent fitness scores.
11 Output agent information.
// Evolution Step:
-// Separately, evolve the worksite strategies of pure
// workers, worker-employers, and pure employers.
1 Table 1: Logical Flow of thelACE Labor Market Framework" •
no more than wq work offers outstanding to employers at any given time, and each employer can
axrcept no more than eg work offers from workers at- any given time, where the work offer quota
j'I • j." ' ,11' • ' fi '' ' '
wq and the acceptance quota eq can be any positive integers.® Although highly simplified, these
parametric specifications will be seen in Section 4, below, to permit the study of a variety of labor
I' • I .1
market structures operating under different ex ante capacity constraints.
As outlined inTabie 1,each'agent in the initial generation is constructed and assigned a random
strategy governing worksite interactions. The agents then enter into a nested pair of generation
cycle and trade cycle loops during which they repeatedly determine contractual partnerships, engage
in worksite interactions, update their expected utility assessments for worksite partners based on
newly recorded payoffs, and evolve their worksite strategies over time.
TWs labor market framework facilitates the study of labor markets from an agent-based per-
®When wq exceeds 1, the workers can be interpreted"as'some 'type ofinformation service provider (broker, coiisul-
tant, ...) able to provide services to more than one employer at a time.
class Agent
{
Internal State Information:
My physiological attributes;
My endowments;
My beliefs/preferences;
Adc^sses for other agents;
Additional data about other agents.
Internal Behavioral Rules:
Rules for communicating with other agents;
Rules for gathering, processing, and updating information;
Rules for determining my contractual partners;
Rules for conducting my worksite interactions;
' R\iles for updating my beliefs/preferences;
Rules for calculating my welfare;
Rules for altering my rules.
};
Table 2: Schematic Description of an Agent
spective in two key ways. First, as depicted in Table 2, each agent is instantiated as an autonomous
endogenously interacting software agent with internally stored state information and internal be
havioral rules. The agents can therefore engage in anticipatory behavior. Moreover, using stored
agent addresses together with internalized communication protocols, they can communicate with
each other at event-triggered times, a feature not present in standard economic models.
Second, as seen in Table 1, the labor market framework is modular in design. This means that
experimentation with alternative specifications for market structure, search and matching among
workers and employers, worksite interactions, expectation formation and updating, and evolution of
worksite strategies can easily be undertaken — much like changing a lightbulb in a multi-bulb lamp
— as long as the interfaces (inputs and outputs) for the modules implementing these specifications
remain unchanged. Moreover, each of these modules can potentially be grounded in agent-initiated
actions in the sense that the module is implemented via behavioral rules internal to the agents.
Finally, the transitory and longer-run implications of each alternative module specification can be
studied at three different levels: individual characteristics of workers and employers; interactions
among workers and employers (network formation); and social welfare as measured by descriptive
statistics such as average agent welfare and unemployment rates.
A brief description will now be given for the particular module specifications used in all exper
iments reported below. See McFadzean and Tesfatsion [41] for a more careful description.
If an employer accepts a work offer from a worker in any given trade cycle, the worker and
employer are said to be matched for that trade cycle. Each match' constitutes a mutually agreed
upon contract stating that the worker shall be employed at the worksite of the employer until the
beginning of the next trade cycle. These contracts are risky in that outcomes are not assured.
Specifically, each matched worker and employer engage in a worksite interaction modelled as
a two-person prisoner's dilemma game reflecting the basic efficiency wage hypothesis that worker
effort levels are affected by overall working conditions (e.g.,' wage levels, respectful treatment, safety
considerations, ...). The'worker can either cooperate (exert high work effort) or defect (engage
in shirking). Similarly, the employer can either cooperate (provide good working conditions) or-
defect (provide substandard working conditions)'.• The range of possible payoffs is assiimed to be
the same for each match in each trade cycle: namely, as seen in Table 3, a cooperator whose
contractual partner defects receives the lowest^possible payoff L (the-sucker payoff); a defector
whose contractual partner also defects receives a payoff D\ a cooperator whose contractual partner
also cooperates receives a payoff C; and a defector whose contractual partner cooperates receives
the highest possible payoffH (the temptation payoff). -The payoffs are assumed to be measured in
utility terms and to be normalized about 0, so that L<D<Q<C<H. They are also assumed
to satisfy the usual regularity condition {L + 'H)/.2 < C guaranteeing that mutual cooperation
dominates alternating cooperation and defection on average.
Matches between workers and employers are determined using a modified version of the well-
studied "deferred acceptance mechanism" originally designed byGale andShapley [21]."^ Under this
modified mechanism, hereafter, referred to as the deferred choice and refusal (DCR) mechanism,
each worker submits up to wq work offers to employers he ranks as most preferable on the basis
See Roth and Sotomayot [48] for a careful detailed discussion of Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance matching
mechanisms, including a discussion'of the way in which the Association ofAmerican Medical Colleges since WWII
has slowly evolved such an algorithm (the National Intern Matching Program) as' a way'of matching interns to'
hospitals in the United States.
Worker
Employer
c d
(C,C) (L.H) .
(H,L) (D,D).
Table 3: Payoff Matrix for the Worksite Prisoner's Dilemma Game
of expected payoff and who he judges to be tolerable in the sense that their expected payoff is
not negative. Similarly, each employer selects up to eq of his received offers that he finds tolerable
and most preferable on the basis of expected payoff and he places them on a waiting list; all other
offers are refused. Workers redirect refused offers to tolerable preferred employers who have not yet
refused them, if any such employers exist; Once employers stop receiving new offers, they accept
all work offers currently on their, waiting lists.
A worker incurs a transactions cost in the form of a negative refusal payoff R whenever ^
employer refuses one of his offers during the matching process; the employer who does the refusing
is not penalized.® An agent who neither submits nor accepts work offers during the matching
process receives a wallflower payoff 0. The refusal and wallflower payoffs are each assumed to be
measured in utility terms. .
Agents use a simple learning algorithm to update their expected utilities on the basis of new
payoff information. Each agent v assigns an exogenously given initial expected utility U° to each
potential contractual partner z with whom he has not yet interacted. Each time an interaction
with 2 takes place, v forms an updated expected utility assessment for z by summing U° together
with all payoffs received to date from interactions with z and dividing this sum by one plus the
number of interactions with z.
®This is equivalent to assuming: (a) each worker incurs a transactions cost for each work offer he makes; and (b)
the worksite payoffs in Table 3 are each increased by the amount of this transactions cost, so that a worker who
succeeds in having a work offer accepted is able to recoup the transactions cost he incurred by making this offer.
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Tlie worksite behavior of each agent is governed by a finite-memory pure strategy for playing a
prisoner's dilemma game with an arbitrary partner an indefinite number of times, hereafter referred
to as a worksite strategy. At the end of each trade cycle loop, the worksite strategies of pure workers,
pure employers, and worker-employers are- separately evolved by means of a standardly specified
genetic algorithm involving recombination, mutation^ and elitism operations.® This evolution is
meant to reflect the formation and transmission of new ideas-rather than biological reproduction.
Specifically, if a worksite strategy successfully results in high fitness for an agent of a particular
type, where fitness is measured by average payoff, then other.agenU of ^e.same type are led to^
modify their own strategies to more closely resemble the successful strategy.
An important caution is in order here, however. Given the extent of information currently
allowed to agents during the evolution step — i.e., knowledge of the complete strategies of all
other agents of the same type, whether expressed in interactions or not — the evolution step is
more appropriately interpreted as a stochastic search algorithm for determining dominant outcomes
rather than as a cultural transmission mechanism per se. The resulting welfare outcomes will be
• -'. . 'i 1 )
usedin subsequent work as benchmarks against which to assess the effectiveness ofmore realistically
modelled cultural transmission mechanisms.
i' • . T. . ,
3 Descriptive Statistics
In this section care is taken to explain the ex ante and ex post measures that have been con-
^ -.i; ' '1- * ' ^ i > • ,
structed to aid in the experimental determination of correlations between ex ante market structure
^More precisely, for each subpopulation of agents, the genetic algorithm evolves a new collection of agent worksite
strategies from theexisting collection ofagent worksite strategies by applying the following four steps: (1) Evaluation,
in which a fitness scoreis assigned to each strategy in the existing strategy collection; (2) Recombination, in which
offspring {new ideas) are constructed by combining the genetic material (structural characteristics) ofpairs ofparent
strategies chosen from among the most fit strategies iii the existing strategy collection; (3) Mutation, in which
additional variations (new ideas) are constructed by mutating the structural characteristics ofeach offspring strategy
with some small probability; and (4) Replacement, in which the most fit (elite), worksite strategies in the existing,
collection of strategies ate retained for the new collection of strategies and the least fit worksite strategies in the
existing strategy collection are replaced with offspring strategies. See McFadzean and Tesfatsion [41] for a" more
detailed discussion ofthis use ofgenetic algorithms in-the TNG, and see Goldberg [23] and Mitchell and Forrest [43]
for a general discussion of genetic algorithm design and use.• > • ,
ir
and ex post contractual network formation, and'between contractual network formation and the
types of worksite behaviors and social welfare outcomes that these contractual rietworks support.
Contractual networks depict who is working for whom, and with what regularity. Worksite be
havior refers to the specific actions undertaken by a worker (or employer) in worksite interactions
with any given employer (worker). Finally, social welfare measures the overall utility achieved by
the workers and employers from repeated worksite interactions within the context of a possibly
changing network of contractual partners.
3.1 Classification of Contractual Network Types by Distance
Let s denote a pseudo-random number generator seed value for the TNG source code used to
implement the ACE labor market framework (see footnote 5), and let e denote a potential TNG
economy, i.e., an economy characterized structurally by the TNG source code together with all of
the user-specified TNG parameter values apart from s. The realized TNG economy generated from
e, given the seed value s, is denoted by {s, e).
Since worksite strategies are represented as finite state machines,the actions undertaken
by any agent v in repeated worksite interactions with another agent z must eventually cycle.
Consequently^ these actions can be summarized in the form of a worksite history HiP, where the
handshake H is sl (possibly null) string of worksite actions that form a non-repeated pattern and the
persistent portion P is a (possibly null) string of worksite actions that are cyclically repeated. For
example, letting c denote cooperation and d denote defection, the worksite history dddidc indicates
that Vdefected against 2: in his first three worksite interactions with z and thereafter alternated
between defection and cooperation.
Two agents v and z are said to exhibit a persistent relationhip during a given trade cycle loop
T of a realized TNG economy (s,e) if the following two conditions hold: (a) their worksite histories
finite state machine (FSM) is a system comprising a finite collection of internal states together with a state
transition function that gives the next internal state the system will enter as a function of the current state together
with current system inputs. For the application at hand, the inputs are the actions selected by a worker and an
employer engaged in a worksite interaction. See McFadzean and Tesfatsion [41] for a more detailed discussion and
illustration of the FSM representation used in the TNG source code.
12
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(b) accepted work offers between v and z do not permanently cease during T either by choice (a
permanent switch away to strictly preferred contractual partners) or by refusal (one agent becoming
intolerable to the other because his expected utility drops below zero).
, •t 1( _ , Ij ). 1 , ' ' . f ' ' ' i • •' ' ' • ' .
Apossible pattern ofcontractual relationships among the agents V{e) in the final generation of
a potential TNG economy e is referred to as a contractual network, denoted generically by K{e).
Each contractual network iir(e) is represented in the form of a directed graph in which the nodes
of the graph represent the agents V(e), the edges of the graph (directed arrows) represent work
I '
offers directed from workers to employers, and the edge weight on any edge denotes the number of
accepted work offers (contracts) between the worker and employer connected by the edge.
Let V°{e). denote a base contractual pattern that partially or fully specifies a potential pattern
• 1 II' ^ . I ' ii • ' • L
of contractual relationships among the agents V{e) in the potential TNG economy e. For example,
• ' • ' = i ' 'i -- • • • .L i mM - . r. '
V°{e) could designate that each worker directs offers to at least two employers. Let K°{e) denote
,, • . ,] • TV '-I 1 'i' 1. V '
the base contractual network class consisting of all contractual networks K(e) whose edges conform
to the base contractual pattern V°{e). Also, let K{s,€) denote the contractual network depicting
the actual pattern of contractual relationships among'the agents V(epn the final generation of the
realized TNG economy {s,e). The redticed form contractual network K^{s,e) deriyed from K{s,€)
' . • I ' 1 li ' ' I ^ I ' • vi'.v " 'II.
by .eliminating all edges of K(s,e) that correspond to non-persistent relationships is referred to as
the persistent contractual network for (s,.e).
The distance D°(s,e) between the persistent contractual network K'P(s,e) and the base con-
••I . • ' . • , .1 • . - Ci / •!
tractual network class K°(e) for a realized TNG economy (5,e) is then defined to be the number
. ' I, i.-' ,, i ^ I. ,•/. M .
of nodes (agents) in K^{s,e) whose arrow patterns (persistent relationships) fail to conform to the
J , ^ * •
base contractual pattern V°{e). This distance measure provides a rough way to classify the different
• t " I i' • >; rii . ',1 > I , ,, , '
types of persistent contractual networks observed to arise for a given value of e as the seed value $
' r 'J. . - , , • . • • . I; • • . • . If
is varied.
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3.2 Classification of Worksite Behaviors and Welfare Outcomes
An agent in a realized TNG economy («, e) is referred to as an unprovoked defector (UD)
if lie engages in at least one defection against another agent who has not previously defected
against him. The vector giving the separate UD percentages for pure workers, pure employers, and
worker-employers in the final generation of (5,e) is referred to as the UD profile for (5,e). The UD
profile measures the extent to which the different types of agents behave agressively in worksite
interactions with contractual partners who are either strangers or who so far have been consistently
cooperative.^^
Moreover, v is referred to as &persistent wallflower (PWF) if v constitutes an isolated node of
the persistent contractual network K^{s,e). Alternatively, v is referred to as a repeat defector (RD)
>
if Vestablishes at least one persistent relationship for which the persistent portion P of his worksite
history H:P includes a defection d. If, instead, v establishes at least one persistent relationship and
his worksite history for each of his persistent relationships has the general form ^:c, he is referred
to as a persistent cooperator (PC).
The vectors giving the separate PWF, RD, and PC percentages for pure workers, pure employers,
and worker-employers in the final generation of (5, e) are referred to as the PWF profile, the RD
profile, and the PC profile for (5,e), respectively. The PWF profile measures the extent to which
the different types of agents fail to establish any persistent relationships, whereas the RD and PC
profiles measure the extent to which the different types of agents establish persistent relationships
characterized by predacious or fully cooperative behavior, respectively. By construction, an agent
must either be a PWF, a RD, or a PC. Thus, only the PWF and PC profiles are reported in the
experiments discussed below.
The vector that separately gives the average fitness score for pure workers, pure employers, and
worker-employers, respectively, in the final generation of a realized TNG economy {s,e) is referred
^^The importance of stance towards strangers in determining subsequent outcomes in path dependent contexts
such as the ACE labor market framework has been stressed by Orbell and Dawes [46].
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to as the FIT profile for (5, e). The FIT profile constitutes a measure ofsocial welfare.
4 Some Experimental Findings
The labor market experiments reported below focus on three simple labor market structures:
endogenous-type markets comprising 24 worker-employers; two-sided markets comprising 12 pure
workers and 12 pure, employers;' and partially-fluid markets comprising.S pure workers, 8 pure
employers, and 8worker-employers. Within each market structure, four different configurations for
theworker offer quotawq and employer acceptance quota eq areexamined: high excess capacity (e^
>> wq)\ zero excess capacity (eq = wq = 1); tight capacity (eq = 1 and wq = 2); and extremely
tight capacity (eq << wq). The genetic algorithm elite value is automatically adjusted in each
experiment to maintain the elite proportion at approximately 67% for each nonzero agent type.
The values for all remaining parameters are maintained at fixed values.throughout all experi
ments. Table 4 lists these fixed parameter yalues along with the specific agent type values, quota
values, and elite value for a two-sidedmarket experiment with high excess capacity. The parameter
values in Table 4, together with the TNG source code, constitute a potential TNG economy e in
the sense defined in Section 3.1.
For each tested e, twenty TNG economies (s,e) were experimentally generated using twenty
arbitrarily selected seed values s for the TNG pseudo-random number generator.^^ The persistent
contractual network K^{s,€) for each run 5 was determined and graphically depicted, and the
mean and standard deviation for the UD (unprovoked defector), PWF (persistent wallflower), PC
(persistent cooperator), and FIT (fitness) profiles were determined and recorded.
A base contractual pattern V°(e) was then specified for each tested e. Although the choice of
this base pattern is simply a normalization determining a 0 point for the distance measure and
I I . I " 1,^1
hence intrinsic^y arbitrary, the degree of specificity of this base pattern governs the dispersion of
' . ' .5
the resulting distance values and the extent to which these distance values display useful correlations
^^These twenty seed values are as follows: 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 45, 65, 63, 31, 11, 64, 41, 66, 13, 54, 641, 413, 425,
and 212. .The final fourteen values were deteimined by random throws of two and three die.'
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// PARAMETER VALUES HELD FIXED ACROSS EXPERIMENTS
GMax s= 50 // Total number of generations.
IMax = 150 // Number of trade cycles in eadt trade cycle loop.
MutationRate ~ .005 // GA bit toggle probability.
FsmStates = 16 // Number of intema] FSM states.
FsmMemory = 1 // FSM memory (in bits) allocated to past move recall.
RefusalPayoff = -0.5 // Payoff R received by a refused agent.
WallfiowerPayofT = +0.0 // Payoff received by ao inactive agent.
Sucker = -1.6 // Lowest possible worksite payoff, L.
BothDefect = -0.6 // MutuiJ defection worksite payoff, D.
BothCoop = +1.4 // Mutual cooperation worksite payoff, C.
Temptation =: +3.4 // Highest possible worksite payoiT, H.
InitExpPayoff := +1.4 // Initial expected utility level, U".
AgentCount = 24 // Total number of agents.
// PARAMETER VALUES VARIED ACROSS EXPERIMENTS
PureWorkers — 12 // Number of pure workers.
PureEmployers = 12 // Number of pure employers.
Wocka-Employers = 0 // Number of worker-eraployers.
Elite = 8 // Niunber of elite for eadi nonzero agent type.
WorkerQuota —1 // Worker offer quota wq.
EmployerQuota =12 // Employe- acceptance quota eq.
Table 4: Parameter Values for a Two-Sided Market with High Excess Capacity
with worksite behaviors as measured by the UD, PWF, PC, and FIT profiles. In practice, then, the
choice of the base contractual pattern was fine-tuned so that the resulting distance values provided
a meaningful informative classification of network types. Given V°{e), the distance D°{Sye) of
h'^is.e) from K'^ie) was recorded for each run s, and a histogram for the distance values D°{s,e)
was constructed giving the percentage of runs s corresponding to each possible distance vaJue.
Finally, as a rough stability check, the number of generations was aJso increased to 100 for each
tested potential economy e and the minimum, maximum, and average fitness scores for the agents
in each of the 100 generations were graphically generated for each realised economy (5,e).
One interesting finding observed for the tested potential economies e is the remarkable stability
exhibited by the average agent fitness scores over generations 25 through 100 for many of the
corresponding realized economies (5,e), with stability often setting in as early as generation 10.
This observed stability in average fitness scores occurs despite the ceaseless change in the underlying
worksite strategies induced by repealed application of genetic algorithm operations. Cases in
which instabilities were detected in average fitness scores are noted in the discussion of specific
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experimental findings, below. • i "
•'Anotlier interesting finding observed for mciny of the tested economies e is the existence ofmul
tiple distinct types of persistent contractual networks ,K^{s,e), each supporting a distinct pattern
of worksite" behaviors. More precisely, .the distance values for the persistent ^contractual networks-
tend to cluster around a small number of isolated distance values, and the mean distance of each
distance cluster tends to be strongly correlatedwith the mean UD, PWF,PC, and FIT profiles cal
culated for the duster:' iFor such economies,' then, there does.not 'appear to be any central-tendency
networkin the sense defined- by'Banks and Carley.[12] but rather a number of different local basins
of attraction. Oiie possible^ explanation for these distinct distance clusters is that they correspond
to multiple Nash equilibria for the underlying evolutionary match-and-play game in which the
agents are participating. On the other hand,t'the distinct distance clusters could be artifacts of the
relatively small sample size'of 20 that was used in these experiments in order to keep the graphical
determination and analysis of network formations manageable. More testing is needed here.
A third interestirig finding is that the optimality criteria conventionally used to evaluate the
performance of matching mechanisms in static market contexts turn out to be highly incomplete
indicators of performance from an evolutionary vantage point. The static viewpoint hides the
• ' I I ' • J 'I' 1 .1 ' , { ' " • •
Strong role played by market structure and ex ante capacity constraints in determining the types of
••'j \ . ->• . • ,, , .'I ;
persistent matching networks that evolve, the types of persistent interaction behaviors that these
• • I ' -'P.' . • • i•
networks support, and the transactions costs and inactivity costs to agents that the achievement of
these persistent networks and behaviors entails. In addition, the static viewpoint takes preference
rankings over potential partners as given' whereas these rankings are continually updated on the
basis of past interactions in evolutionary' settings. Indeed, matching networks and interaction,
behaviors evolve conjointly. This suggests the need for more comprehensive optimality criteria that
take both facets into account.
More concretely, in all of the labor market experiments reported here, the DCR mechanism
described in Section 2 is used to match workers and employers. The matching outcomes gener-
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ated via the DCR mechanism have been shown {Tesfatsion [57, 58]) to have the usual optimality
properties associated with Gale-Shapley type matching mechanisms: namely, pairwise stability;
and Pareto optimality from the vantage point of workers, the agents who actively make offers.
Nevertheless, the actual evolutionary outcomes observed in these labor market experiments include
autarkic economies in which all agents are persistent wallflowers, exploitive economies in which
employers persistently defect against cooperate workers or workers persistently defect against co
operative employers, and fully harmonious economies in which all agents are persistent cooperators.
Moreover, due to transactions costs (negative R payoffs) and inactivity costs {0 wallflower payoffs),
social welfare can still be low even if all active agents are persistent cooperators. These evolution
ary outcomes are systematically related to market structure and to ex ante capacity constraints as
represented by the worker offer quota wq and the employer acceptance quota eq.
A more detailed summary of the findings for each market structure will now be given.
4.1 Endogenous-Type Labor Market Experiments
Consider an endogenous-type labor market economy e comprising 24 worker-employers with a
worker offer quota wq = I and an employer acceptance quota eq = 24. These quota values indicate
that e has a high excess capacity in the sense that the total number of work offers the employers
can accept in each trade cycle far exceeds the maximum number of work offers that workers caa
make. As depicted in Figure 1(a), the base contractual pattern V®(e) for this economy c is as
follows: Each worker-employer directs work offers to other worker-employers without latching.^^
— Insert Figure 1 About Here —
A worker is said to be latched to an employer z if he works for z continuoasly {in each successive trade cycle) rather
than intermittently (randomly or recurrently). In the directed graph representations for base contractual patterns
in Figures 1, 3. and 4. latched persistent relationships are depicted as straight edges and intermittent persistent
relationships are depicted as zig-zag edges.
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For this e, as detailed in Table 5(a),90% of the runs (5,e) were observed to lie in the distance
cluster 0-3. More precisely, in 18 of the 20 runs for this e, at most 3 of the 24 worker-employers in
the final agent generation deviated from the base contractual pattern V'Ce). Moreover, the mean
UD profile for distance cluster 0-3 was 3%, meaning that on average only 3% of the agents in the
final generation of each run in this distance cluster engaged in aggressive worksite behavior. The
mean PWF profile for this distance cluster was 1%, i.e., on average, only 1% of the agents in the
final generation ofeach run in this distance cluster were both unemployed (as workers) and inactive
(as employers). The mean PC profile for this distance cluster was 96%, i.e., on average, 96% of the
agents in the final generation ofeach run in this distance cluster ended up engaging in persistently
cooperative behavior. Finally, the mean FIT profile for this distance cluster was 1.36, meaning
that the agents in the final generation of each run in this distance cluster ended up with an average
utility level (per interaction) that was very close to the mutual cooperation payoff level of 1.40.
— Insert Table 5 About Here —
A rough stability check was conducted for each of the 18 realized economies (5,c) in distance
duster 0-3 for this high excess capacity economy e to check whether the information recorded in
Table 5(a) for the final (fiftieth) generations appeared to be informative for other generations as
well. Specifically, holding alJ other parameter values fixed, the number of generations was increased
to 100 and the minimum, average, and maximum fitness scores attained by the agents in each of
these 100 generations were recorded and graphically depicted. Figure 2 depicts the stability results
obtained for the realized economy (413,c) with distance value 0; these results are typical of the
stability results obtained for all economies in distance cluster 0-3. The average fitness scores are
seen to fluctuate closely around the mutual cooperation payoif level, 1.40, over generations 10
Tables 5. 6, and 7, below, the standard deviations for the UD (unprovoked defector), PWF (persistent
wallflower), and PC (persistent cooperator) profiles are measured in percent^es; they appear in parentheses beneath
the mean values for these profiles and are rounded off to the nearest integer value. Also, the standard deviations
for the FIT (fitness) profiles appear in parentheses below the mean FIT profiles and are rounded off to two decimal
places. The calculation of these standard deviations is not applicable (NA) for distance clusters encompassing only
one run, i.e., for distance clusters encompassing only 5% of the total sample of 20 realized economies.
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through 100.
— Insert Figure 2 About Here —
As seen in Table 5(a), two outlier runs also occurred for this high excess capacity c at distance
values 11 and 23. The outlier run at distance 11 is characterized by a high degree of latching
and a high degree of RD behavior. The outlier run at distance 23 is even more interesting — a
wallflower crash occurs in generation 18. XJD behavior is so prevalent that most agents quickly
become intolerable to all other agents as worksite partners; only three worksite interactions take
place in each of the three final trade cycles in generation 18. By generation 50 this outlier run is still
in an unsettled slate. As seen in Table 5(a), 96% of the agents engage in UD behavior, although
88% ultimately end up in latched PC relationships. The stability check for this realized economy
indicates, however, that the economy fully recovers from the wallflower crash by generation 64 in
the sense that UD behavior is rare and most agents exhibit PC behavior. Moreover, this recovery
is sustained through generation 100.
All of these observations would appear to have a simple structural explanation. In endogenous-
type economies, all agents evolve together in the evolution step. Hence, any worksite strategies
garnering below-average fitness scores are soon eliminated and replaced with variants of more suc
cessful strategies. Consequently, a strong evolutionary inducement exists towards uniform expressed
worksite behavior and. in particular, towards mutual cooperation, which is the uniform expressed
worksite behavior that generates the highest agent fitness scores. The only issue, then, is the extent
to which capacity constraints impose transactions costs (in the form of negative refusal payoffs) on
workers trying to find tolerable job openings. In the case of high excess capacity, workers face zero
structural risk of refusal from employers due to capacity constraints; employers only refuse workers
if they engage in an intolerable number of worksite defections.
This situation changes dramatically, however, as capacity is incrementally tightened. As de
picted in Figure 1 and detailed in Table 5, the base contractual pattern changes from random
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dispersion ofwork'offers to disjoint'doubly-latched pairings ofworkers and employers, and average
agent fitness scores mbnotonically decrease. It is not'aggression, or predation in the forni of UD or
RD behavior" that^results "in'lower fitness scor'es for the agents in these tighter capacity- cases but
rather'the'ever larger accurnulatioh of refusal ipayoffs (transactions costs) that the agents, incur in'
their attempts to find tolerable worksitei partners. • i • <
4.2 Two-Sided Labor Market Experiments
Next consider the case of a two-sided labor market economy e comprising 12 pure workers and
12 pure employers with a worker offer quota w? = 1 and an employer acceptance quota,eg = 12,
implying that excess capacity is high. Indeed, the structural risk to workers of having their offers
refused,by employers on the basis of limited acceptance capacity is zero. Incontrast, th^e employers
are forced tq be inactive unless workers happen to direct work offers their way, implying that the
employers face a substantial^^structural risk of incurring w^lfiower payoffs. The economy e thus
represents a "workers' inarket.'\As depicted in Figure 3(a), the base contractual pattern V°(e) for
this economy e is as follows: Each worker is latched to at least one employer, and no employer is a
wallflower. . , •
• — Insert'Figure 3 About'Here '— '
'I r .I •' • ' I 'o. li' • ''' •1'j
As seen in Table 6(a), 75% of the runs (5,e) for this high capacity e were observed to lie in the
distance cluster 3-9. In this distance cluster, the very low mean FIT value of 0.35 for employers
is due to two factors: a'high level of inactivity (high mean PWF percentage) due to high excess
capacity; and aggressive and persistently predacious behavior (high mean UD and low mean PC
"' • . Iy I ' I ' j . r I / I ' , r t-
percentages) by workers that induces retaliatory RD behavior in some employers. The persistent
contractual networks resulting from the runs (5, e) in distance cluster 3-9 reveal the following
typical scenario: RD workers latch on to a selected subset of employers and drive down their fitness
I > i'. , .:i I , • I . • • ' ij; I' ' ' ' ' i
scores to small positive values, causing the remaining employers to become inactive PWFs with
fitness scores very close to 0 — indeed, the magnitudes of the distances D°{s,e) for these runs is
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essentially a count of the number of inactive employers. This ensures that the worksite strategies
of the exploited employers are advantaged in the evolution step relative to the worksite strategies
of the employers who are inactive. Since (pure) workers and (pure) employers evolve separately,
the worksite strategies of the exploited employers tend to reproduce into the next generation. In
this way the workers breed and maintain a subset of wimpy employers that they can repeatedly
exploit to their benefit.
— Insert Table 6 About Here —
Table 6(a) also shows that the remaining 25% of the runs for this e lie in a second distance
cluster 23-24. The mean FIT value of 1.02 achieved by employers in this second distance cluster is
higher than that achieved in distance cluster 3-9 due to the higher mean percentage of PC behavior
exhibited by both workers and employers. This mean FIT value is nevertheless substantially below
the mutual cooperation payoff level, 1.40, due to the 5% inactivity level among employers, a struc-
tual consequence of high excess capacity that is independent of how cooperatively the employers
behave in their worksite interactions. The typical contractual pattern exhibited in this distance
cluster is PC workers randomly directing work offers among employers without latching. Note that
the mean FIT value 1.39 achieved by workers is very close to the mutual cooperation payoff level.
When excess capacity is reduced to zero, the typical contractual network dramatically changes.
As depicted in Figure 3(b) and detailed in Table 6(b), about 80% of the workers now form persistent
relationships with employers in the form of disjoint doubly-latched pairings. The reason for the
latching is that workers who fail to latch tend to accumulate a large number of refusal payoffs and so
become relatively disadvanted in the evolution step relative to those who latch. Nevertheless, even
workers who succeed in latching onto one employer typically accumulate 2 or 3 refusal payoffsfrom
a wide range of employers on the way to attaining this coordinated state, and these transactions
costs tend to lower the mean FIT value of workers relative to employers.
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The stability checks conducted for this zero excess capacity case reveal that many oftherealized
economies exhibit unsettled average fitness score behavior over generations 1 through 100 in the
• V- ' / .r' • • - •
form of.persistent drifting, bubbling, or regime shifts. The reason for this appears to be that
contractual networks are particularly vulnerable to initially cooperative mutant invaders when
excess capacity is zero since the networks form in'response'to refusal payoffs and yet support
largely PC or even c:c worksite behavior.
As capacity keeps tighteningj workers have an increasingly difficult time forming any persistent
relationships with employers, a finding indicated in'Figure 3 by the decreasing'size of worker boxes
relative to employer boxes as one moves from part (a) to part (d). This increased coordination
• ' II * • * * ' I t . I »x t »
failure is detailed in Table 6. Note, "in particular, the'growing mean percentage of workers who
become unemployed (PWFs) as capacity successively tightens.
4i3 Partially-Fluid Labor Market Experiments
Finally, consider a ^partially-fluid labor market econonay e comprising 8 pure workers (pw),
8 pure employers (pe), and,8 worker-employers (we) with a worker offer quota wq = 1 and an
employer acceptance quota eq —16, implying that excess .capacity is high. As depicted in Figure
4(a), the base contractual pattern V°{e) for this economy.e is as follows: Each,worker directs work
offers to employers without latcWng, and no pure employer is a wa^ower.
— Insert Figure 4 About Here —
.111 . w'- 1 ,
As seem in Table 7(a), the runs (s^e) for this e are divided about equally into three distance
clusters. In the first distance cluster, although all agents exhibit a high degree of PC behavior, and
few become persistent walMowers, pure employers nevertheless tend to accumulate large numbers of
wallflower payoffs. Consequently, pure employers have a mean FIT value, 1.03, that is low relative
to the mean FIT value of 1.38 for pure workers and 1.38 for worker-employers. In the remaining
' ' ' • . , ' • 'VI * ' '.'It. 1; '
two distance clusters, there is a substantial increase in latching behavior, in UD and RD behavior
(particularly among workers), and in unemployment among pure workers and inactivity among
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pure employers that results in lower mean FIT profiles for these agents.
— Insert Table 7 About Here —
The stability checks for the 20 runs for this high excess capacity economy e reveal unsettled
average fitness score behavior over generations 1 through 100 in the form of a wallflower collapse
(1 run), bubbles (2 runs), regime shifts (6 runs), and persistent drifting (4 runs). It was at first
conjectured that this observed instability might be due to the small population size of 8 for each
agent type. Surprisingly, however, when the experiments were re-run with an increased population
size of 12 for each agent type, keeping all other parameter values fixed, the resulting distance values,
worksite behaviors, and social welfare outcomes closely resembled those obtained for the smaller
population size.
It therefore appears that the instabilities observed in average fitness scores for these individual
runs may instead be due to the fluid role played by worker-employers. In particular, the abil
ity of worker-employers to function either as workers or as employers permits them to crowd out
the pure workers or the pure employers, causing them to degenerate into PWFs. In addition,
worker-employers have the unique ability to form a self-sufficient network of contractual relation
ships without the participation of either pure workers or pure employers. Indeed, the persistent
contractual networks for the second distance cluster in Table 7(a) are characterized by degeneracies
of this type.
As capacity is incrementally tightened, the risk to pure employers of high wallflower payoff"
accumulation recedes and is replaced by the risk to pure workers of high refusal payoff accumu
lation. As seen in Table 7, the increasingly favorable structural setting for pure employers tends
to encourage increased UD behavior by pure employers and to discourage UD behavior by pure
workers. Consequently, there is an increased tendency for the flexible worker-employer agents to
behave as pure employers, in the sense that they continue to receive work offers but they ultimately
stop making any work offers themselves.
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Tliis tendency is seen in the changing natureof/the base contractual patterns depicted inFigure
4, which give themost predominant types ofcontractual networks that form ascapacity is decreased
from high excess^to tight. In particular, as seen^in Eigure'4(c). and Table 7(c), in 75% of the runs
for the tight capacity c^e nearly all of the worker-employers behave as-pure .employers in their,
persistent relationships. When capacity'becomes ^tremely tight, however, Figure 4(d) and Table
7(d)-show that complete^ coordination failure occurs in^75% ofthe runs, in the sense that all agents
in these runs degenerate into persistent wallflowers... ' . ^• . . • •
Finallyj comparing-part (a)-of Figure'-'4 with parts (b), (c); and (d),"note .the extraordinarily
strong disciplinary role played by ex ante capacity constraints in 'the determination, ofevolutionary
outcomes for partially-fluid'labor marketieconomies;<For examplepas one moves from high excess
capacity in part (a) to tight capacity in-part'('bj, the'economy moves from diffusive work offers to
disjoint doubly-latched triads consisting of'one pure worker, one worker-employer,,and .one pure
employer, with welfare outcomes shifting decidedly in'favor of the pure employers/ j . ' ,
Indeed,"as indicated in Figures 1 and 3'as wellj ex ante'-capacity constraints play la^strong co
ordinating role in all-of the previoiisly reported experimental findings. As suggested..by Gode and
Sunder [22], whenatteniptingto understand-the cause of-perceivedregularities in'market outcomes,
it is important to carefully separate the effects of institutional constraints^per'Se from.the effects of
the cognitive-functioning of the agents participating-in ithe market. It will-be interesting to deter
mine," in future! studies, the extent to which the netwdrk-patternS'determined for the experiments
at hand are retained under similar ex ante capacity.'conditions as'the modelling for agent cognition
is varied.
5 Concluding Remarks
The hallmark of the ACE approach to socio-economic modelling is a bottom up perspective, in
' '1 . ' ' , .1,.' . . i. . , , r . ^ ? •• ;
the sense that global regularities are grounded in local agent interactions. The previous sections
illustrate how the ACE approach is currently being applied to the study of evolutionary labor
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markets with, adaptive search and worksite behavior.
As developed to date, however, this labor market framework only partially achieves the ACE
goal of a bottom up perspective. The commencement of the different modules (matching, worksite
interactions, evolution step) is still synchronized across all agents from the top down, and the
evolution step is not yet implemented in terms of internalized agent behavioral rules. The advantage
of imposing this synchronized dynamic structure with an external evolution step is that it permits
some results to be obtained concerning the configuration, stability, uniqueness, and social optimality
of the persistent contractual networks that form. The disadvantage is that the networks may not
be robust to realistic relaxations of these top-down constraints.
In addition to achieving a more complete bottom-up modelling of a labor market, an enormous
amount of work remains to be done to achieve the ultimate goal of calibrating the ACE labor market
framework to specific real-world labor market contexts using natural data, survey data, and human-
subject laboratory data. For example, signalling among agents, (e.g., wage bids and offers) needs
to be introduced, and capacity constraints must be endogenized so that they are determined as
a function of past activities. Also, the role of government regulations (e.g., minimum wage laws)
must be considered. Finally, there is the need to imbed labor markets in a more complete ACE
modelling of a decentralized market economy. ,
Nevertheless, it is hoped that the preliminary results presented in the previous section suggest
how an ACE approach could provide modelling foundations permitting the rigorous study of the
self-organizing capabilities of decentralized market economies.
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Figure 1: Base Contractual Patterns for Endogenous-Type Labor Markets with Different Ex
Ante Capacities. A relatively larger box for the worker-employers (WE) under a particular capacity
specification indicates that the worker-employers achieve a relatively higher mean FIT value under this
capacity specification in realized economies whose contractual networks approximate the base contractual
pattern. Straight directed edges indicate continuous persistent relationships (latching) and zig-zag directed
edges indicate intermittent persistent relationships.
Genetic Algorithm
GMak
IMas
Random Seed
Mutation Rate 0.005
Hnite State Machine
Slates
M^oiy
8i2li*i
Pavoffs
Init Expected
Refusal
WaUfbwer
i^trade N^work Game
T rader Count
Seller Count
Buver Count
Both Coop
Both Defect
Suckei
Temptation
ECte
Seller Quota
Buver Quota
:sX<«'»x^'^ssV^«5<«5SS<±S
TNG SimulatioTi Results
7tiiii«i«scfz«0Mi«ia«SutmjMnia4«t4i
<5<AS4S4S:S5S
&SS5S;iS>i5«
«51S4SSSS-cS
<5\\XW«CS«<i<iVS«NSV\^^
55SiSS
s«§ m^s
A• max fitness
avg fitness
min fitness
Figiu-e 2: StabiKtjr Check for an Endogenous-^pe Economy wth High Excess Capacity. The
maximum, minimum, and average fitness scores are ^aphed for ageht generations 1 through 100. By
generation 25 the average fitness scores closely fluctuate around 1.40, the mutual cooperation payoff level.
D° Cluster % Runs Mean UD Mean PWF Mean PC Mean FIT
0-3 90% 3% 1% 96% 1.36
(3%) (2%) (4%) (.05)
11 5% 8% 0% 38% 1.34
(NA) - (NA) (NA) (NA)
23 5% 96% 0% 88% 1.13
• (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA)-
Table 5(a): Endogenous-Type Labor Markets with High Excess Capacity
D" Cluster % Runs Mean UD Mean PWF Mean PC Mean FIT
0^ 100% 8% 2% 96% 1.19
(22%) - (3%) (5%) (.06)
Table 5(b): Endogenous-Type Labor Markets with Zero Excess Capacity
D" Cluster % Runs Mean UD Mean PWF Mean PC Mean FIT
2-11 85% 1% . 1% 98% 0.95.
(2%) (2%) • (4%) (.04)
24 15% 100% 100% 0% -0.17
(0%) (0%) (0%). (.00)
Table 5(c): Endogenous-Type Labor Markets with Tight Capacity
D° Cluster % Runs Mean UD Mean PWF Mean PC Mean FIT
2-12 70% 3% 3% 94% 0.89
(5%) (7%) (9%) (.07)
24 30% 100% 100% 0% -0.16
(0%) (0%) (0%) (.00)
Table 5(d): Endogenous-Type Labor Markets with Extremely Tight Capacity
Table 5. Experimental Findings for Endogneous-Type Labor Markets
with Different Ex-Ante Capacities
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Figure 3: Base Contractual Patterns for Two-Sided'Labor Markets .with'Different Bx Ante
Capacities. A relatively larger box for an agent type — pure workers (PW) or pure employers (PE) —
under a particular capacity specification indicates that this agent type achieves a relatively higher mean FIT
value under this capacity specification in the realized economies whose contractual networks approximate
the base contractual pattern". Straight directed edges indicate continuous persistent relationships (latching)
and zig-zag directed edges indicate internuttent persistent relaticmsliips.'
D" Cluster % Runs Mean UD Mean PWF Mean PC Mean FIT
pw pe pw pe pw pe pw pe
3-9 75% 97%
(5%)
16%
(34%)
2%
(3%)
40%
(12%)
3%
(5%)
39%
(28%)
1.74
(.27)
0.35
(.14)
23-24 25% 2%
(3%)
5%
(7%)
2%
(3%)
5%
(7%)
98%
(3%)
95%
(7%)
1.39
(.02)
1.02
(.03)
Table 6(a): Two-Sided Labor Markets with High Excess Capacity
D® Cluster % Runs Mean UD Mean PWF Mean PC Mean FIT
pw pe pw pe pw pe pw pe
0-2 80% 15%
(32%)
22%
(38%)
1%
(3%)
1%
(3%)
94%
(6%)
86%
(25%)
1.07
(.20)
1.34
(.21)
4 5% 100%
(NA)
100%
(NA)
17%
(NA)
17%
(NA)
0%
(NA)
0%
(NA)
0.62
(NA)
0.29
(NA)
24 15% 0%
(0%)
22%
(20%)
0%
(0%)
8%
(0%)
89%
(16%)
78%
(20%)
0.24
(.08)
1.42
(.05)
Table 6(b): Two-Sided Labor Markets with Zero Excess Capacity
D" Cluster % Runs Mean UD Mean PWF Mean PC Mean FIT
pw pe pw pe pw pe pw pe
0-7 55% 2%
(3%)
5%
(9%)
19%
(10%)
4%
(7%)
81%
(10%)
96%
(6%)
0.30
(.05)
1.35
(.09)
24 45% 100%
(0%)
90%
(28%)
82%
(26%)
77%
(34%)
3%
(8%)
5%
(13%)
0.04
(.20)
0.22
(.39)
Table 6(c): Two-Sided Labor Markets with Tight Capacity
D° Cluster % Runs Mean UD Mean PWF Mean PC Mean FIT
pw pe pw pe pw pe pw pe
0-6 35% 1% 1% 12% 1% 86% 96% 0.31 1.37
(3%) (3%) (4%) (3%) (7%) (6%) (.03) (.06)
15-17 20% 10% 92% 35% 2% 17% 25% 0.35 1.22
(14%) (14%) (7%) (4%) (20%) (34%) (.17) (.20)
24 45% 100% 100% 100% 100% 0% 0% -0.10 -0.01
(0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (.00) (.00)
Table 6(d): Two-Sided Labor Markets with Extremely-Tight Capacity
Table 6. Experimental Findings for Two-Sided Labor Markets
with Different Ex Ante Capacities
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Figure 4: Base Contractual Patterns for Partisdly-Fluid Labor Markets with Different Ex Ante
Capacities. A relatively larger Box for an agent type ^— pure workers (PWj, worker-employers (WE), or
pure employers (PE) — under a particular capacity specification indicates that this agent type achieves a
relatively higher mean FIT value under this capacity specification in the realized economies whose contractual
networks approximate the base contractual pattern. Straight directed edges indicate continuous persistent
relationships (latching) and zig-zag directed edges indicate intermittent persistent relationships.
' 'j • -. ? I j' ;'
D° % of 4ean UD MeanPWF VIean PC Mean FIT
Cist. Riins pw pe we pw pe we pw pe we pw pe we
0-2 30% 2% 2% 6% 2% 2% 0% 98% 98% 81% 1.38 1.03 1.38
(5%) (5%) (10%) (5%) (5%) (0%) (5%) (5%) (32%) (.01) (.03) (.03)
6-9 35% 25% 41% 39% 14% 41% 0% 75% 48% 64% 1.16 0.73 1.25
(40%) (48%) (41%) (35%) (48%) (0%) (40%) (41%) (38%) (•11) (.24) (.09)
16-21 35% 98% 23% 98% 16% 30% 2% 18% 40% 21% 1.13 0.55 1.43
(4%) (38%) (4%) (35%) (30%) (4%) (34%) (37%) (35%) (.63) (.25) (.30)
Table.7(a): Partially-Fluid Labor Markets with High Excess Capacity
D° % of Mean UD Mean PWF Mean PC Mean FIT
cist. Runs pw pe we pw pe we pw pe we pw pe we
0-6 80% 6% 20% 9% 0% 1% 2% 98% 92% 97% 1.16 1.42 -1.11
(24%) (10%) (24%) (0%) (3%) (4%) (4%) (24%) (5%) (.06) (.14) (.13)
16-24 20% 100% 28% 47% 28% 25% 6% 0% 19% 53% 0.20 0.87 0.87
(0%) (42%) (47%) (42%) (31%) (11%) (0%) (14%) (47%) (.17) (.33) (.22)
Table 7(b): Partially-Fluid Labor Markets with Zero Excess Capacity
D°
Cist.
% of
Runs
Mean UD Mean PWF Mean PC Mean FIT
pw pe we pw pe we pw pe we pw pe we
Q-7 75% 2%
(4%)
19%
(38%)
17%
(34%)
6%
(8%)
4%
(7%)
1%
(3%)
75%
(28%)
80%
(38%)
83%
(34%)
0.63
(.19)
1.30
(.19)
0.90
(•07)
10 10% 0%
(0%)
50%
(50%)
50%
(50%)
19%
(6%)
44%
(44%)
50%
(50%)
81%
(6%)
56%
(44%)
50%
(50%)
0.32
(.10)
0.85
(.53)
0.46
(.49)
24 15% 100%
(0%)
100%
(0%)
100%
(0%)
100%
(0%)
100%
(0%)
100%
(0%)
0%
(0%)
0%
(0%)
0%
(0%)
-0.13
(.00)
-0.02
(.00)
-0.13
(.00)
Table 7(c): Partially-Fluid Labor Markets with Tight Capacity
D°
Cist.
% of
Runs
Mean UD Mean PWF Mean PC Mean FIT
pw pe we pw • pe we pw pe we pw pe we
0 75% 100%
(0%)
100%
(0%)
100%
(0%)
100%
(0%)
100%
(0%)
100%
(0%)
0%
(0%)
0%
(0%)
0%
(0%)
-0.13
(.00)
-0.01
(:oo)
-0.13
(.00)
16 5% 0%
(NA)
0%
(NA)
100%
(NA)
25%
(NA)
0%
(NA)
25%
(NA)
38%
(NA)
88%
(NA)
0%
(NA)
0.52
(NA)
1.33
(NA)
0.57
(NA)
23-24 20% 0%
(0%)
6%
(11%)
3%
(5%)
0%
(0%)
3%
(5%)
0%
(0%)
97%
(5%)
97%
(5%)
97%
(5%)
0.39
(.07)
1.36
(.07)
0.79
(.04)
Table 7(d): Partially^Fluid Market Experiments with Extremely Tight Capacity
Table 7. Experimental Findings for Partially-Fluid Labor Markets
with Diiferent Ex Ante Capacities
